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RECENT DECISIONS
Attorneys-Bar Integration.-In Integration of the Bar Case, 11
N.W. (2d) 694 (Wis. 1943), the Integrated Bar Law' was declared
validly enacted and constitutional. The case was instituted by order of
the court for reasons stated in Goodland v. Zimmerman,2 because of the
desirability of an immediate and final determination of the validity of
the law, and the special interest to the court, since the bill is in the form
of a direction to the court to put into effect the organization of the
Bar.3
The case deals primarily with the relationship between the two
branches of government, the legislative and the judicial. In determin-
ing whether the bill was validly enacted, the court delineated the limits
of judicial regulation of legislative procedure.4 The court reaffirmed
the "journal rule": namely, that the journal of the legislative body may
be used to show that the enrolled bill is erroneous.- The journal, how-
ever, cannot be impeached by oral testimony, or by any notes or mem-
oranda.6 In discussing the practical reasons for this doctrine, the court
declared that if oral testimony were admissible to determine the validity
of an enactment, it would lead to uncertainty in the law; and that refor-
mation of the journal by the court on the basis of oral testimony would
amount to an interference with the legislative department. The court
also upheld the legislative practice by which "paired" members are
regarded as absent, even though there would not be a requisite two-
thirds were they counted as present.
In considering the constitutionality of the law, the court discussed
the relative power of the legislature and the judiciary over the Bar.7
1 Chapter 315, Session Laws of 1943.
2243 Wis. 459, 10 N.W. (2d) 180 (1943).
Goodland v. Zimmerman was an action by the governor to enjoin the secretary
of state from publishing the Integration of the Bar Bill. Held a court has no
jurisdiction to enjoin legislative process; and the governor had no "interest"
sufficient to entitle him to maintain suit.
3 Similar order in In Re Appointment of Revisor of Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236
N.W. 717, (1931).
4 See Judicial Regulation of Legislative Procedure in Wisconsin, Wis. Law
Rev., 1941, No. 4, July, '41.
5 Loomis v. Callahan, 196 Wis. 518, 220 N.W. 816, (1928).
6Auditor General v. Menominee County, 89 Mich. 552, 51 N.W. 483 (1891).
See 40 L.R.A., p. 32.
7 States have taken various positions on the matter. Some few subscribe to the
theory that the legislature may prescribe the rules for admission to the bar
and for the regulation of attorneys, while the court enforces the decisions of
the legislature. Re Applicants for License to Practise Law, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E.
635, (1906). Other courts refer to the inherent power of the judicial branch
over the bar. In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646, (1899). The third position
includes the Wisconsin holding, that the legislature and the courts have a dual
jurisdiction. Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646, (1911). Re Leach,
134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E. 641, (1893). In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152,
(1918).
See 4 Texas Law Rev. 1.
RECENT DECISIONS
The position taken in In re Cannon8 was affirmed, namely, that the
ultimate control of the Bar rests with tthe judiciary, 9 although the legis-
lature may enact regulatory measures under the police power.10 The
source of the power of the judiciary is purportedly inherent, in that
attorneys are the officers of the court.' Therefore, although the legis-
lature may set out rules for barristers in the interests of the general
welfare, such measures are always subject to review as to whether they
are adequate12 or embarassing to the court.23
Under this dual jurisdiction, integration of the Bar may be initiated
by either the judiciary or the legislature; the former, under the inherent
power'4 ; the latter, as an act conducive to the public interest.', The
court interprets Chapter 315 as a declaration by the legislature that the
integration of the Bar will promote the general welfare. It is obvious
that there is no delegation of legislative power to the Supreme Court,
since that body Itself could have initiated Bar Integration. The more
delicate question, however, concerns the form of the bill, since it is
worded: "The Supreme Court shall"-provide for organization and
government of the State Bar Association. It is clear that this could not
be construed as an order since one branch of government cannot issue
a mandate to another as to matters within the power of the other
branch. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the bill be treated as a
"memorial" invoking the power of the court was not adopted. The
court regarded the act as imore than a mere suggestion, basing its deci-
sion on the customary deference of the judiciary to legislative enact-
ments which do not embarass the court or impair its constitutional
function."
Thus, while the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has in no way relin-
quished its power to control the Bar to the legislature, it has allowed
the legislature to take the initiative in the matter of Bar Integration.
MERRIEM LUCK.
8206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932).
9 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 12:209, Ap '40.1o. Wis. L. Rev. 8:74-6 D '32.
Marq. L. Rev. 16:213-215 Ap '32.
"In re Cannon, supra.
1 In 1849, Ch. 152 of the Laws of 1849 was enacted, stating that any resident of
the state showing good moral character should be admitted to practise as an
attorney. This law was disregarded by the courts. Chief Justice Ryan discusses
this statute in In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 20 Am. Rep. 42 (1875).
's In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
'4 114 A.L.R. 151 at 161.
25 State Bar of Oklahoma v. McGee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 Pac. 586 (1931).
16 In re Goodell, supra.
In re Goodell, 48 Wis. Appendix, 693, 81 N.W. 551 (1879).
